Suchergebnisse

This article begins by examining strategic culture studies, in particular Alan Bloomfield's concept of different sub-cultures in strategic culture. It then focuses on the border between Russia and Finland and how Finnish EU membership was made possible by Finland's decision not to challenge the WWII border treaty with the Soviet Union after the Soviet collapse. Next, it investigates the debates and public opinion relating to Finland's 1994 EU referendum, to see how the dynamics changed three strategic cultural sub-groups: "self-defence", "Westernisers" (including Western international organizations) and "Reassurance and Dialogue with Russia". In conclusion, it is argued that EU membership altered the hierarchy of these strategic culture sub-groups in Finland, as well as their substance. These changes were, however, more evolutionary than revolutionary.

The article examines Russia as a great power from the point of view of status inconsistency theory. Applications of the theory to Russia have focused on the status accorded to Russia in diplomatic representation and membership of key international organizations, which suggests that Russia is a 'status overachiever' in that it has an international status that is greater than its actual capabilities would warrant. However, this article focuses on Russian perceptions of the country's status internationally, especially as reflected in the actual experience of membership in international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe) and relations with the EU in the context of the two Chechen wars. The article demonstrates that, at least according to Russian assessments, Russia is accorded lower status in these organizations than the great power status which most Russians believe should be theirs. While concluding that status inconsistency is a useful tool for explaining Russian foreign policy behavior, the article notes that differing assessments of what Russia's level of status recognition is pose challenges for status inconsistency theory.

This dissertation addresses the difficulties encountered in international relations between Russia and the West, specifically Europe, in spite of their cultural and geographical proximity and the expectation that Russia and Europe would share values and interests following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The problem is addressed through focussing on a particular aspect of Russia s national and state identity greatpowerness . Greatpowerness - the self-perception that Russia always has been and still is a great power - is a significant part of Russia s self identity. The effects of Russian greatpowerness are examined through investigation of Russia s relations with three European international organisations the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe from the early 1990s through to 2004. The particular issue through which these relationships are explored are the two Chechen wars of 1994-1996 and 2000-2004. Russian actions in Chechnya provoked frequent criticisms from the West, but were seen in Russia in the 1990s as an internal matter, and as part of the international war on terrorism in the 2000s. In both cases, they reflected in part Russia s great power aspirations. There were particular sets of expectations from the Russian side based on its self-perception in each case. It is argued in the dissertation that this plays a part in understanding the difficulties and apparent inconsistencies encountered in Russia s relationship with the West. The dissertation contributes to explaining inconsistencies in Russian foreign policy behaviour towards the West which are not adequately accounted for by existing empirical and theoretical approaches. It begins with a discussion of definitions of being a Great Power and understandings of greatpowerness as an issue of self-perception in state identity. It then looks at Russian understandings of international relations, different Russian foreign policy schools and a series of factors which are persistent in Russian greatpowerness: sovereignty, ressentiment, isolationism, expansionism, imperialism, multilaterism and multipolarity. Next it sets the course of the two Chechen wars in the context of Russian political and international development. The main empirical section of the dissertation is taken up by the three case studies of the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, noting similarities and distinctions in each case as to how Russia experienced interaction with the three different organisations. The Council of Europe has adopted a rather pragmatic approach in its cooperation with Russia and hence, in spite of some difficulties, the relationship has been the best of the three. This cooperation has challenged Russian greatpowerness the least and expectations came closest to outcomes. Cooperation with the EU has been of a different nature since Russia is not a member state. Here the relationship has had good and bad periods, which have very much depended on how Russia has felt about its level of expectations met by outcomes. The Russian relationship to the OSCE was also full of ups and downs always with strongly power political reasons. Russian expectations were highest in regards to the OSCE. However it challenged Russian greatpowerness most and caused biggest disappointment. In conclusion, it is shown that Russian self-perception of greatpowerness and the aspiration to have its status as a Great Power recognised internationally provides one part of the explanation of the apparent inconsistencies while showing a form of consistency in Russia s relationship with the West.

U.S. Congressional publication. 3 pp. ; The U.S. Serial set is a specially bound, consecutively numbered version of all House and Senate reports and documents. Many, but not all, of the government documents in the Americas archive come originally from the U.S. Serial set, although were bound together at some later point into the collection that is now represented in this collection.

La amenaza híbrida es un concepto que aparece en documentos oficiales y estrategias de seguridad de los estados. Tanto la UE como la OTAN han tomado medidas serias para contrarrestar la actividad relacionada con las amenazas híbridas. Este monográfico sobre comunicación digital y amenazas híbridas tiene como objetivo avanzar en la comprensión de cómo los actores de amenazas híbridas utilizan y pueden potencialmente explotar el entorno de la información para atacar las sociedades democráticas y los procesos de toma de decisiones en diferentes niveles, para diferentes propósitos. Las TIC han traído avances notables en la forma en que obtenemos información y construimos conciencia sobre el mundo y sus eventos e interactuamos con los demás, pero al mismo tiempo crean oportunidades para realizar operaciones e influenciar con una intención hostil. La guerra política, las medidas activas y las acciones encubiertas dirigidas por la comunicación no son nuevas, y la propaganda se ha utilizado a lo largo de la historia en situaciones de conflicto y guerra. Estas herramientas son empleadas por actores autoritarios hostiles y / o en una escala que ha interferido en procesos democráticos como las elecciones, erosiona la confianza en las instituciones, polariza y divide las sociedades de manera malsana. Dado que los seres humanos toman decisiones basadas en sus representaciones sobre el mundo y la información disponible a través de interacciones simbólicas interpersonales y a través de los diferentes medios, la información puede ser utilizada deliberadamente para actividades malignas que produzcan efectos cognitivos, afectivos y conductuales. ; Hybrid Threats is a concept that has entered to many states official documents and security strategies. Both the EU and NATO have taken serious measures to counter hybrid threats related activity. This special issue on digital communication and hybrid threats aims to advance our understanding of how hybrid threat actors use and can potentially exploit the information environment for targeting our democratic societies and decision-making processes at different levels for different purposes. Information and communication technologies have brought remarkable advances in the ways we obtain information and build awareness on the world and its events and interact with the others, but at the same time these developments create opportunities for conducting information and influence operations with a hostile intent at an unprecedent scale.Political warfare, active measures, and communication-led covert actions operations are not new, and propaganda has been used throughout the history in conflict and war like situations.However today our digital communication environment and the communication tools that we employ for legitimate purposes are also being employed by hostile authoritarian actors and / or their proxies at scale that has interfered in our democratic processes like elections, erode trust in our institutions, polarize and divide our societies in an unhealthy ways and sow animosities between states and international partner countries. Since human beings make decisions based on their representations about the world and the information available through interpersonal symbolic interactions and through the different media, information can be deliberately utilized for malign activity to produce cognitive, affective and behavioral effects. ; Ameaças híbridas é um conceito que entrou em documentos oficiais e estratégias de segurança de muitos estados. Tanto a UE como a OTAN tomaram medidas sérias para combater a atividade relacionada com ameaças híbridas. Esta edição especial sobre comunicação digital e ameaças híbridas tem como objetivo avançar nossa compreensão de como os atores de ameaças híbridas usam e podem explorar o ambiente de informações para direcionar nossas sociedades democráticas e processos de tomada de decisão em diferentes níveis para diferentes fins. As tecnologias de informação e comunicação trouxeram avanços notáveis nas maneiras como obtemos informações e construímos consciência sobre o mundo e seus eventos e interagimos com os outros, mas, ao mesmo tempo, esses desenvolvimentos criam oportunidades para conduzir informações e influenciar operações com uma intenção hostil em um escala sem precedentes.A guerra política, as medidas ativas e as operações de ações secretas conduzidas pela comunicação não são novas, e a propaganda foi usada ao longo da história em conflitos e situações semelhantes à guerra. No entanto, hoje nosso ambiente de comunicação digital e as ferramentas de comunicação que empregamos para fins legítimos também estão sendo empregados por atores autoritários hostis e / ou seus representantes em escala que tem interferido em nossos processos democráticos como eleições, corroendo a confiança em nossas instituições, polarizando e dividindo nossas sociedades de forma prejudicial à saúde e semeiam animosidades entre Estados e países parceiros internacionais.